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What Was Molyneux's Question a Question About?
Jonathan Cohen (University of California, San Diego)
and
Mohan Matthen (University of Toronto)1
Nearly nine hundred years ago, the Andalusian Muslim statesman and
philosopher, Abu Bakr ibn Tufail  (1105-1185), conjectured that all  sensory
qualities were material, and inferred from this that they would have at least
some  characteristics  that  can  be  discerned  independently  of  sensory
experience. Thus, he said, if a newly sighted man encountered colours for
the first time, he would experience them in ways consonant with (at least
some) descriptions of  colours he had been given while still  unsighted. Or
perhaps he meant something stronger, namely that the newly sighted man
could actually recognize the colours on the basis of the descriptions he had
been given  while  still  unsighted.2 Of  course,  on  either  interpretation,  ibn
Tufail’s  claim  is  controversial:  for,  granting  that  all  sensory  qualities  are
material, it may be that at least some material qualities are known to us only
by our sensory experience of them—and so the newly sighted man might
have no prior knowledge on which to hang the descriptions he was given of
colour.  Nevertheless,  the  conjecture  prepares  us  for  the  realization  that
some material qualities might not be available to  any sense, and others to
more than one.
1 This is a fully collaborative work of the two authors.
2 In  this  formulation,  ibn  Tufail’s  conjecture  concerning  colour  does  not  turn  on
amodal or inter-modal knowledge. In Lenn Goodman’s translation (this volume), the crucial
passage is 
Suppose . . . his eyesight were restored and he could see. He would walk all through
the  town  finding  nothing  in  contradiction  to  what  he  had believed,  nor  would
anything  look  wrong  to  him.  The  colors  he  encountered would conform  to  the
guidelines that had been sketched out for him. 
This  leaves  it  open  whether  or  not  visually based  “guidelines”  could  enable  him,  in
Molyneux’s words, to “distinguish and identify by sight alone” which of an apple and a leaf
was red and which was green. For suppose he had been told something like: “Red is a dark,
warm colour  that  is  very  unlike  green,  which  is  bright  and  cool.”  C.L.  Hardin’s  (1988)
discussion of spectral inversion (ibid. 134-54) could be taken to imply that he might actually
be able to identify red and green on this basis. If so, then, perhaps ibn Tufail was right.
WHAT WAS MOLYNEUX’S QUESTION A QUESTION ABOUT?
The translation of ibn Tufail’s  book into Latin by Edward Pococke in
1671 sparked a lively discussion of the empirical construction of concepts.
(See  Goodman,  this  volume.)  William  Molyneux  pursued  ibn  Tufail's
conjecture in a narrower and less controversial form.3 Famously, he asked
Locke  (who  would  likely  have  recognized  the  allusion)  whether  a  newly-
sighted man could,  by sight alone, distinguish and identify a globe and a
cube, which he previously knew only by touch. This is a specific problem
about qualities that can be sensed in more than one modality—Is there an
inter-modally transferrable, or amodal, element in the identification of three-
dimensional solids? Though derived from ibn Tufail, this question leads in a
different direction. Our purpose here is to ask how it generalizes. What was
the theoretical nerve that it is supposed to touch? Why is it so revealing? 
The  problem  that  guides  us  in  this  paper  is  more  pointed  than
Molyneux's about sensory knowledge in a newly acquired modality. We ask:
How are ideas formed in each modality, and, given how they are formed,
what  cross-modal  correspondences  can  we  expect  to  find?  This  question
invites a more granular line of inquiry—one that takes us into details of the
construction  of  specific qualities.  But it  makes ibn Tufail's  conjecture and
Molyneux's question unexpectedly relevant to a number of unconnected, but
familiar  problems  that  arise  out  of  contemporary  theorizing  about
perception.  For,  in  contrast  with  many  familiar  approaches,  ours  poses
questions about cross-modal divergence and convergence that range more
widely  than  those  envisaged  by  eighteenth  century  philosophers.  These
questions  are  neutral  about  sensory  carry-over  of  the  kind  queried  by
Molyneux.4 In short,  it  turns out that there are more questions and more
answers on this terrain than Molyneux, Locke, and most of their successors
realized.
3 Whether he came across the topic by reading ibn Tufail  or through the ensuing
discussion is not clear.
4 In  fact,  one  way that  our  approach  is  neutral  is  that  it  does  not  turn  on  any
particular  demarcation of  the sense-modalities.  In  Matthen and Cohen (forthcoming),  we
even note the possibility of within-modality Molyneux Questions.
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I.  On the origin of general ideas
Very likely, Molyneux and Locke thought of the question like this. We
know certain shapes by touch. We also know the very same shapes by sight.
Consider,  then,  the  idea of  a  shape  given  to  us  by  touch—the  mental
representation of a shape that we arrive at by touching it ("the Object of the
Understanding when a Man thinks," as Locke puts it). Is this the same as the
idea of the same shape given to us by sight? Or are these ideas different? To
repeat: these questions are not the same as asking whether there can be
tactual and visual ideas of the same shape. There can be different ideas of
the same thing.
Molyneux's  question  is  about  the  ability  to  identify  a  shape,  or  to
distinguish it from others. Whether or not he and Locke were clear about it,
this is a question about general ideas, i.e., ideas of repeatable types—Can
the newly-sighted man visually  recognize  this  particular  thing here as an
instance of a general idea that he earlier arrived at by tactual experience of
other things? According to Locke, a general idea is an abstraction created by
discarding irrelevant characteristics of particulars. For instance, the general
idea  of  a  triangle  is  "neither  Oblique  nor  Rectangle,  neither  Equilateral,
Equicrural nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at once." (Essay IV.vii.9)
The question Molyneux poses is not about all  aspects of visual or tactual
experience of globes and cubes. A particular globe might look red, shiny, and
about a foot across; at the same time, it might feel cold, dry, and about a
foot across. Some of these attributes of the globe are purely visual, some
purely  tactual;  one  is  (apparently)  shared.  None  of  them,  however,  are
essential  to  the  general,  repeatable  idea,  GLOBE,  as  such;5 they  are  all
discarded in the psychological act of generalization that terminates in that
general idea. This invites the question: What qualities are retained when a
blind man forms a general idea of a globe from his tactual experience? 
5 We capitalize terms that stand for ideas and italicize those that stand for properties.
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Now: It  is clear that in at least some cases, one can, by discarding
components of an idea originally experienced by touch, arrive at a residue is
not  specifically  tactual—the  general  ideas  THREE-DIMENSIONAL,
SYMMETRICAL, EQUALLY SLOPED are examples of this. So when we consider
the general idea, GLOBE, formed from touch, we should ask: Are the retained
qualities  specifically  tactual,  or  does  the  resultant  general  mental
representation subsume the visual presentation as well, as a presentation of
the  very  same  repeatable  type?  And  this  naturally  raises  the  question
whether the general idea that results from normal visual processing is the
same or different in content from the idea that the blind man possesses.
Molyneux's  Question  has  sometimes  been  thought  to  be  about  the
"differences between the qualitative or phenomenal character" of visual and
tactual experiences of the same thing (see e.g., Schwenkler 2019). For the
subjective  experience of  exploring  a  globe  by  touch  is  obviously  quite
different from that of examining it by sight6—and this is clearly a relevant
consideration.  But  Molyneux's  Question  is  not  about  the  particular
experiences  that  a  newly-sighted man suffers  when he looks  at  a  globe.
Rather,  it  is  about  this  man’s  ability  to  apply  a  general  idea—i.e.,  a
representation  of  a  repeatable  perceptual  property—that  he  obtained  by
touch to objects newly encountered in visual experience. Since general ideas
omit certain features of particular experiences, we have to ask whether the
retained characteristics are inter-modally comparable. In other words: Can
the subjectively different experiences of the same shape thrown up by two
different sense modalities be subsumed under the same general idea, or at
least general ideas that can be compared across phenomenal differences? 
Locke answered Molyneux negatively. And perhaps he did so because
he was not alert (in that context) to how vision and touch can arrive at the
same general ideas by discarding specifically modal aspects of experience.7
6 But see Campbell 1996 (304), who thinks (on naïve realist grounds) that the shape
itself constitutes, indeed individuates, any experience of it.
7 In Essay II 5, Locke writes, “we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of
the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling.” For discussion
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But even if we disagree with Locke about this, there is another question that
arises for anybody who was inclined to think that general ideas of shape are
cross-modally  comparable.  Allow  that  a  general  idea  arrived  at  by  touch
alone could in fact be the same in content as that arrived at by vision. We
still do not know whether it is equally apt to be applied to a particular idea by
vision.  Take the  idea  BOUNDED OBJECT.  This  is  clearly  an idea  that  has
application in more than one modality. Yet, its method of application might
differ in different modalities: specifically, in touch, vision, and audition. So, it
could very well be that a newly sighted man might be hesitant in identifying
bounded objects visually. 
Coming back to the general idea, GLOBE, the point to be emphasized
here is that shared content is not the only question of interest that Molyneux
raised. Concede, in other words, that there is only one general idea in play,
or  that  there  are  two  but  with  significant  cross-modal  structural
correspondences  of  content.  The  question  still  remains:  Can  one  just  as
easily use the tactually formed idea to "distinguish and identify" a shape as a
globe (rather than a cube) when looking at it as when touching it? And: Is the
perceptual process by which retained qualities are identified analogous or
different?  
II. Experience, ideas, and properties
When addressing Molyneux's Question, one can ask about at least four
different contrasts between visual and haptic perception.
(1) Experience of seeing a globe vs experience of feeling it by touch.
(2) Idea generalized from visual experience vs idea generalized from
touch. 
(3) The property revealed by vision vs the property revealed by touch. 
(4) The ability to re-identify by vision the property revealed by touch.
of this and related points, see Matthen and Cohen, forthcoming.
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Much of the philosophical dialectic regarding MQ revolves around the
connections among the first three contrasts. We’ll follow this dialectic for the
most part, though we will make mention of the additional contrasts with (4).
On one hand, it is clear that the experiences (1) are different. Some
are inclined to think that this settles the question about the ideas, (2).  An
empiricist might argue that one cannot erase the sensory source of one's
general  ideas  in  the  relevant  cases.  If  so,  then  a  negative  answer  to
Molyneux’s Question follows: the general ideas are different. 
On  the  other  hand,  sphere is  a  geometric  or  spatial  property  that
entails  qualities  such  as  symmetry  and  roundness.  Some  writers  (e.g.,
Bennett, 1965, and Evans, 1985) hold that these qualities are inter-modally
comparable. According to them, there is no relevant difference between the
items in (3). And this, they think, settles, or at least severely constrains, the
question about ideas—SPHERE must be the same general idea across vision
and touch, or at least structurally similar enough to distinguish it from CUBE.
Both sides err by neglecting the bridge from their starting point to the
middle  term—  that  middle  term  being  (2)  general  ideas.  For  both,  the
question is: Is sensory experience of a geometrical solid sufficient to form a
modality-neutral  subjective  representation  of  the  solid?  An  empiricist  like
Locke answers ‘No' because of the difference in the experiences; Bennett
and Evans answer 'Yes' because of the alleged non-modality of the sensed
properties. But it's not clear exactly where the answer turns from negative to
positive when we go from (1) to (3). As against Locke, there's the possibility
that all  tactually specific dimensions of  the idea are bleached out  by the
generalization process before we get to (2). As against Bennett and Evans,
there's the possibility that even if our ideas of shape represent an amodal, or
intermodally comparable, property, the general ideas formed from modally
specific experience are sufficiently tainted by their modal origins as to be not
only distinct, but also difficult, or even impossible, to apply in vision when
they originate in touch.
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This sort of question can be asked about other general ideas as well.
Ibn Tufail's conjecture was that colour could be known (at least descriptively)
by touch. This is implausible, because colour is a specifically visual idea (but
see note 2 above). But what about other features known by more than one
sense? Not all of these are shapes; indeed, not all are spatial. For instance,
what about number? If the newly-sighted man were shown one globe on his
left and two on his right, could he distinguish and identify the cardinality of
the two collections by sight alone? And (as Gareth Evans asked) what about
temporally extended experiences: if the newly sighted man were shown a
steady light on the left and a pulsating one on the right, could he tell which
was which? One could ask: is there a general recipe for answering questions
of this sort? Given that we don't know in advance what will be omitted in any
given process of generalization, it doesn't seem that there could be.
In  earlier  work  (Matthen  and  Cohen  forthcoming),  we  argued  that
though  a  negative  answer  is  warranted  in  a  wide  variety  of  cases,  this
conclusion can only be reached empirically and piecemeal. Both empiricists
like  Locke and their  opponents  like  Evans are wrong to treat  Molyneux's
Question  as  a  single  question  about  the  origin  of  ideas  in  different
modalities.8 Rather, it is properly posed as a question about specific ideas in
specific contexts. Thus, we posited “Many Molyneux Questions,” and argued
for a classificatory scheme of these by the spatiotemporal dimensionality of
the property represented by the idea in question. 
In this paper, we venture beyond this conclusion in three ways. 
We argue, first (sections III-V), that in each modality, complex ideas
may differ  structurally  from the corresponding  property.  This  sheds
light  on  how  (contrary  to  the  conclusions  of  Gareth  Evans)  non-
correspondent ideas of the same shape might be constructed from an
inter-modally  shared  representation  of  space.  In  these  cases,  the
8 Cf. Glenney 2013.
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answer to Molyneux’s Question is No: the newly sighted man does not
have anything on which to base visual identification.
Second,  we  show  (sections  VI-VII)  that  in  certain  cases,  different
modalities contingently  construct structurally correspondent  ideas of
shape-  and  space-related  properties.  In  these  cases,  we  get  a
somewhat surprising Yes, if not to Molyneux's Question as posed, then
at  least  to  the  question  whether  there  are  significant  cross-modal
correspondences.  (Of particular interest in this argument:  the "new"
modalities created by sensory substitution.)
Finally (section VIII), we ask (but leave unanswered) new questions in
the style of  ibn Tufail  and Molyneux regarding a significant class of
non-spatial ideas, namely those involved in evaluative perception and
perceptual affect.
III. A New Question: Analyzing ideas
Let's now consider a different path into Molyneux's Question, similar in
some ways to the one originally explored by Denis Diderot (1749/1951) and
discussed by Gareth Evans (1985). Locke distinguishes between simple and
complex ideas. Simple ideas are not put together from other ideas; complex
ideas are. For any complex idea, one can ask: How is it constructed from
simples? Now, suppose (as many philosophers have) that the simple ideas of
touch and vision are always point-located qualities.9 Then, it  would follow
that  shape-ideas,  such  as  GLOBE  and  CUBE,  which  are  about  spatial
distributions  of  points,  are  complex.  So,  if  one  could  establish  that  the
process  of  constructing  the  idea  SPHERE  from  point-located  qualities  is
structurally different in touch and in vision,  this would give us reason for
thinking that this idea is modally specific.
To start with,  the question whether a newly sighted man is able to
recognize a tactual complex idea  without using touch is different from the
9 This is the assumption of the colour mosaic theory sketched by Lewis 1966.
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question  whether  he  is  able  to  recognize  it  by  vision.  For  consider  the
complex idea, RS=ROUND AND STATIONARY. Hold in abeyance the question
whether the newly sighted man would visually be able to identify the simple
ideas,  ROUND  and  STATIONARY.  Allow  this  man  whatever  time  and
experience is sufficient to learn these ideas. And now put the question: what
more would it take for him to be able to identify instances of RS? Presumably
nothing more. AND is an analytic operation, and therefore not one whose
acquisition  depends  on  sensory  experiences  that  the  newly  sighted  man
might be thought to lack. So, it is extremely plausible to think that he needs
nothing more to learn RS than how to identify its simple components. But
this argument does not show that RS can be applied visually. Of course, we
have  reason  for  believing  that  the  conjunctive  idea  AND  is  deployed  in
cognition. But it is a substantive empirical question, not something that can
simply be taken for granted, that AND can be applied straightforwardly in the
construction and deployment of ideas within vision.
Second, note also that one cannot safely conclude that AND is, indeed,
applied in the formation of a visual idea merely from the fact that the idea
picks out a property that has a conjunctive analysis.  Some small  animals
preyed  on  by  large  birds  have  a  distinctive  behavioural  response  (they
freeze) to visually detected instances of the conjunctive property  dark and
looming (but not to visually detected instances of the property dark or of the
property  looming).  Presumably  they  have  a  visual  representation/idea  of
(i.e., whose content is) the complex, conjunctive property. But it does not
follow that this idea is a complex construction with DARK, LOOMING, and
AND as constituents: it could well be that their idea of the property dark and
looming is an uncomposed atom. (As an aside: this would cast doubt on the
notion that all simple ideas are point-located qualities.)  In sum, it is wrong to
think that if a property can be analysed as a conjunction, then the  idea of
that  property  will  be  conjunctive  (and  hence  complex).  The  logical  or
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mathematical structure of a property need not be reflected in the structure
of the sensory idea of that property (cf. Hopkins, 2005).
On reflection, it seems that Diderot's approach to Molyneux's Question
also leans on an analysis of the property, though in a somewhat different
way. Diderot famously holds that vision and touch must have different ways
of  apprehending  the  mathematical  structure  of  shape-properties.  He
assumes (mistakenly, as we contend) that since shape-properties are spatial
distributions of points, shape  ideas must also be constructed from ideas of
spatial distributions. He reasons that, since one can at a single glance form
an impression  of  how spheres  look,  the  visual  idea  can  be formed by a
simultaneous apprehension of the spatial relationships of constituent points.
In contrast, he supposes that the tactual idea of these relations can only be
formed by a temporally extended process: one cannot apprehend the whole
sphere simultaneously by touch, and so one has to rely on moving one's
hands over it. He concludes that the tactual idea of a sphere is different from
the visual idea—the former has a kind of temporal structure that the latter
lacks.
But this line of argument is mistaken. It is true that vision and touch
differ in the spatial range over which they deliver information at a single
instant. However, this is precisely the sort of difference that is put aside in
the abstractive process that leads to general ideas. For consider: if a sphere
is sufficiently small relative to the spatiotemporal range of vision then it can
be visually apprehended at a moment, and one can then immediately form
from it a visually generated general idea of sphericality.10 (In this process,
one discards size information,  inter alia.) And exactly the same is true of
touch: if a sphere is sufficiently small relative to the spatiotemporal range of
touch, one can apprehend its shape at a single instant and form from it a
10 See Klatzky and Lederman (1995) on the haptic glance. 
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haptically-generated  general  idea  of  sphericality  (which  discards  size
information, inter alia).11 
Of course, Diderot is right that if the sphere is too large to be haptically
apprehended at a time, then one needs to engage in temporally extended
haptic exploration to form from it a general idea of sphericality. But the same
is true of vision, with the difference that the spatiotemporal extent of the
visual glance is larger than that of touch. But this is irrelevant, given that
size information is discarded when we form the idea, SPHERE. It would seem,
then, that, with respect to the perceptual acquisition of general ideas, the
modalities  of  vision  and  touch  are  on  a  par:  Diderot's  alleged  structural
contrast  between  the  two  rests  entirely  on  a  modal  difference  in
spatiotemporal  range  that  is  properly  ignored  in  consideration  of  the
perceptual acquisition of general ideas. He simply overlooks the possibility
that a general idea of SPHERE could be constructed from an experience of a
sphere that is small enough to be apprehended at an instant, whether it is a
hand-size sphere apprehensible by touch or a much larger one apprehensible
by vision.
Moreover, and even putting the last point aside, Diderot neglects the
possibility that even if touch apprehends particular spheres temporally, the
general tactual idea of a sphere could be formed by discarding temporality.
(Evans gives some anecdotal evidence in favour of this possibility.) But even
then, it would not follow that touch and sight are equally adept at making
the  comparison.  Even  if  both  modalities  have  a  non-temporal  idea,  they
might have different ideas. Or they may have the same idea (or structurally
comparable ones); nonetheless, blind subjects may still not be able to make
the  cross-modal  comparison  in  a  way  that  enables  them immediately  to
visually recognize spheres when they recover sight. And, as a matter of fact,
11 In neither case does the apprehension at issue demand perceptual contact with all
of the points in the sphere; rather, what is required is presumably just the sort of perceptual
contact  with  facing  surfaces  that  supports  acquisition  of  a  general  shape  idea.  This  is
another way of reinforcing the point that the structure of our perceptually derived ideas
need not be the same as that of the corresponding properties.
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Pawan  Sinha  and  colleagues  report  empirical  evidence  that  indicates  an
inability  of  newly  sighted  people  to  recognize  shapes  (Held  et.  al.  2011;
Ostrovsky, Andalman, and Sinha 2006; Ostrovsky et. al 2009). In short, we
have  no  grounds  for  a  general answer,  or  even  grounds  to  formulate  a
general question. 
To summarize our line of thought in this section: It is wrong to assume
that  a  sensory  idea  of  a  shape  must  reflect  the  analysis  of  the  shape-
property. A sphere is a certain distribution of points in space, but it doesn't
follow  that  the  visual  idea  of  a  shape  is  a  representation  just  of  that
distribution—it may instead reflect gross characteristics distributed across a
surface, for example, a smooth lighting gradient or a certain kind of textural
variation. For this reason, we can't assume that touch and vision recognize
spheres in the same way. If each relies on clues and indications rather than
the actual  geometrical  analysis  of  a  sphere,  they might  rely  on different
cues. Or they might rely on comparable cues (see section VI). The question is
open. 
This informs our general approach to inter-modal transfer: the question
has  to  be  put  for  specific  ideas  of  specific  shapes,  and  not  for  whole
modalities.  Interestingly,  the answers  given by Locke,  Diderot,  and many
contemporary philosophers (including Gareth Evans) follow something much
closer  to  a  whole-modality  strategy.  However,  we  suggest,  reflection  on
Molyneux’s  question  about  globes  and  cubes  motivates  a  finer-grained
approach.
IV. Space and the Modalities: Sceptical Remarks
On its face, the question Molyneux poses is about shape. But Evans
attempts  to reduce this  to an issue about  space—specifically,  about  "the
relation between the perceptual representation of space attributable to the
blind,  and  the  perceptual  representation  of  space  available  in  visual
perception." This is wrong for a number of reasons. The shift from shape to
space occurs  against  the background of  Diderot's  argument.  As  we have
12
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seen, Diderot thought that the blind can perceptually register shape only by
temporally  extended  tactile  exploration,  and  that  their  idea  of  shape  is
therefore that of a process. Evans rightly rejected this argument.
Evans is  right  to reject  a facile  inference from temporally  extended
experience of shape to temporally extended representation of space, but his
critique does not touch Diderot. For a follower of Diderot could concede that
the blind operate with a "simultaneous" conception of space when they are
locating individual points, while still insisting that temporal-process notions
have  to  be  collated  over  time  in  order  to  get  ideas  of  shape.  Non-
simultaneous  shape-representations  are  compatible  with  an  underlying
simultaneous space-representations. 
More significantly, both Diderot and Evans overlook the fact that there
could be more than one way to keep track of position (Tolman 1948, O’Keefe
and Nadel 1978, Gallistel,  1990).  Some animals use travel metrics ("Walk
steadily  for  ten  minutes,  slow  down,  turn  right,  .  .  ."  etc.)  to  measure
position, as inertial navigation systems do. This doesn't preclude them taking
in spatial positions in a single glance. The test of whether an organism is
sensitive to allocentric spatial layout is its ability to get from C to A after first
going from A to B and B to C, where A, B, and C are not collinear. Similarly,
the test of whether it represents an object's shape is its ability to trace the
shape from multiple  different  starting  points—top,  bottom,  middle.  Touch
and vision might be able to keep track of position relative to a starting point
without  employing the same pre-existing representation of  space. In fact,
there  are  significant  structural  differences  between  touch  and  vision
regarding how they represent space (Matthen forthcoming). So, coordinating
the two senses is not straightforward. 
A historical aside. Ibn Tufail's conjecture about the newly sighted man
occurs in his story, Haiy ibn Yaqzan, which is a philosophical allegory about a
boy cast away at birth on an island. Brought up by a gazelle, and utterly
deprived  of  human  contact,  this  boy  comes  to  know  everything  that
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advanced cultures know, from the manufacture of clothing, to morals and
religion,  to  cosmology.  In  the  seventeenth  century,  this  book  was  widely
read, supposedly influencing Spinoza, Hobbes, and Locke (independently of
Molyneux's letter), and inspiring Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. The newly sighted
man is a thought experiment in the Introduction to the book; it elaborates
the  theme of  knowledge  in  the  absence  of  exposure  to  the  most  direct
sources of knowledge: "Colours were such as he had before conceiv'd them
to be, by those descriptions he had receiv'd." Molyneux cleverly plucked this
anecdote from the book (or from the contemporary discussion surrounding
it)  and sharpened it.  But  since it  is  couched in  such specific terms,  it  is
difficult to know exactly how he viewed the problem. Locke himself didn't get
the  point  at  first  glance,  though  he  probably  knew  ibn  Tufail's  book.
Presumably,  Molyneux intended to query ibn Tufail's  theme of knowledge
without  direct  experience.  Cross-modal  carry-over  isn't  the  only
consideration relevant to this theme, nor (as Evans realized) is associative
learning vs innateness. This is why we cast the net wider. 
Given this historical background, it is entirely possible that Molyneux
thought about his problem about cross-modal comparisons and associations
simply as an instance of a much wider puzzlement. You have all sorts of non-
spatial perceptual ideas of familiar things—of your loved ones, of the place
where you live, of your clothes, and so on. You have many feelings evoked
by perception:  remember the terror  induced in  small  animals by looming
shadows.  Are  these  non-spatial  ideas  transferrable  from one  modality  to
another,  or  comparable  between  them?  We'll  return  to  these  questions
below, but for now let's just acknowledge that there is no reason to think
that  Molyneux's  Question  was  ultimately  about  just  shape.  (In  fact,
Molyneux’s original formulation of the question to Locke explicitly invokes
distance: “Or Whether he Could know by his sight, before he stretchd out his
Hand, whether he Could not Reach them, tho they were Removed 20 or 1000
feet from him?”) And even if it was, there is, more importantly, no reason to
14
WHAT WAS MOLYNEUX’S QUESTION A QUESTION ABOUT?
think  that  it  reduces  without  remainder  to  a  problem  about  the
representation of space.
V. Shape: Foundation and Integration
Evans holds that our ideas of location and/or direction are shared by
more than one modality. Suppose he is right. Let a light be switched on. Can
a newly sighted man point to it, or at least tell whether it is on his left or his
right?  Can he make inter-modal comparisons among these presentations? It
is  not  clear:  evidence  suggests  that  these  comparisons  emerge  over  a
complex interactive developmental  trajectory  (Thelen,  et  al,  2001).  Either
way, this does not settle the issue about shape. Suppose that a neonate has
the ability to locate each of a collection of points by both vision and touch.
Suppose further that she can discriminate by touch whether these points are
collinear or not. Would she be able to determine  by vision whether these
points are collinear or not? And, similarly, the newly sighted person? There is
no a priori reason to think that the answer to these questions is 'yes' and no
reason to think that it is 'no' either. The ability to locate points in space is not
the same as the ability to determine whether they stand in complex spatial
relations.  The  senses  may  share  a  representational  framework  for  space
without sharing a representational framework for shapes.
Given these observations, we propose to break the question of inter-
modal comparability of general ideas of shapes up into parts as follows.
1.  Spatial Foundation. Does the ability to locate points by touch have
the same representational basis as the ability to locate points by sight?
2. Integration Step. Given a set of points that have been located by the
Spatial Foundation of touch and also that of vision, is the ability to determine
by  touch  whether  they  constitute  an  instance  of  a  shape  S  structurally
similar to the ability to determine this by vision? And if so, would this help, or
even enable, a newly sighted person to recognize instances of S by vision
alone?
15
WHAT WAS MOLYNEUX’S QUESTION A QUESTION ABOUT?
Our general view is that these questions have to be tackled piecemeal. The
ability to locate points may be context dependent; the formation of general
ideas of shape S might employ the same integrative tools in two modalities,
but this might not be the case for shape S’. 
Even if Evans is right that the Spatial Foundation question should be
answered positively, this does not address the question of the Integration
Step. And as we argued in the preceding section, it is plausible to think that
different  modalities  might  address  this  differently.  In  Matthen and Cohen
(forthcoming), we taxonomized the Integration Step by the dimensionality of
shapes. This allowed us to bring a number of different empirical studies to
bear  on  the  issue,  because,  though  they  are  not  initially  addressed  to
Molyneux's Question, they could be interpreted as addressing the Integration
Step. 
In all of the cases we reviewed, we found that touch and vision follow
different strategies in the Integration Step. So, in these cases, the answer
was  indeed  No.  But  we  did  not  arrive  at  this  conclusion  by  a  general
argument; we had to adduce cases to prove each No. Thus, there is no path
to a general answer to Molyneux's Question. Now, as we'll argue in the next
two  sections,  there  are  cases  where  the  Integration  Step  is  structurally
similar  across  modalities.  Since  the  integrative  strategies  followed  by
different mechanisms for perceptual feature extraction are diverse, there is
no reason to expect a uniform answer across all features.12
VI.  Beyond  Shape:  The  Perceptual  Representation  of  Faces,
Biological Motion, and More
So far, we have largely followed mainstream philosophical tradition in
construing  Molyneux's  question  as,  in  the  first  instance,  directed  at  the
perceptual representation of shape.  But our articulation of the question into
foundational and integration components invites analogous questions about
12 Note that our pluralism about Molyneux’s Question arises from our concern about
particular perceptual strategies for the recovery of individual features; Glenney (2013) and
Hopkins (2005) endorse pluralism about MQ as well, but for different reasons.
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the foundational and integrative roots of non-shape properties as well. For
any property that can be apprehended by multiple modalities, we can ask:
What are the foundational elements and integrative procedures enlisted by
the  different  modalities?  And  are  these  sufficiently  similar  between  the
modalities to allow crossmodal transfer (immediately, with certainty, etc.) for
ideas of these properties?
This  way  of  thinking  of  MQ  is  more  fine-grained  than  our  earlier
dimensional taxonomy in that it allows for obstacles to crossmodal transfer
between pairs of modalities even within a single spatiotemporal dimensional
regime, and even when there can be other cases of successful crossmodal
transfer  between  those  same  two  modalities  and  within  the  same
spatiotemporal dimensional regime.
To see some of the potential obstacles, and with the caveat that, as
we've learned from the shape MQs, we can't expect our answers to such
questions to generalize automatically between cases, we want to review a
number of instances where the evidence suggests that the foundational and
integration steps may be modally specific, hence where crossmodal transfer
may fail.
As  an initial  example  of  this  type,  we  can consider  the  integrative
processes  at  work  in  the  visual  representation  of  human faces.13 Though
there  are  a  number  of  ways  to  bring  out  the  special  features  of  these
processes, one of the most striking comes from the so-called Thatcher effect
—the  finding  (Thompson  1980)  that  local  anomalies  in  the  geometric
organization of faces are dramatically harder to detect in upside-down than
in right-side up faces (see figure 1). This result gives us reason for thinking
that  at  least  some of  the  integrative  processes  involved  in  the  visual
representation of  faces can't  be understood simply as those involved the
ordinary  visual  integration  of  metrical  spatial  information—orientation
matters as well. Faces, then, are treated as a kind of spatial form, but a kind
13 Material in this and the next section overlaps with Cohen (2018).
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for  which  vision  reserves  special  treatment.  (This  is  yet  another  way  of
making the point we made at the end of section III: perceptually informed
ideas of a property need not be composed the same way as the property
itself.)
Figure 1: The Thatcher Effect
There are several other effects suggesting that visual integration for
the representation of faces is special relative to ordinary spatial form. Thus,
detection times are significantly faster for faces than for upside-down faces
or arbitrary assemblages of facial features in non-face arrangements (Purcell
and Stewart 1988; Farah et. al. 1995; Yin, 1969). Visual face recognition is
susceptible  to  characteristic  overgeneration  errors:  we (mis-)  recognize  a
face in a cloud or a mountain far more readily than other objects. It can be
selectively impaired in congenital or acquired defects (prosopagnosia) that
spare other aspects of visual processing (Barton 2003). And it is no surprise,
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given these and similar findings, that vision devotes special resources to face
perception, in the form of dedicated processing (Kanwisher 2010; Sinha et.
al. 2006; Sugita 2009), carried out in specialized neural areas (Liu, Harris,
and Kanwisher, 2010; McCarthy et. al. 1997). (But see below.)
Suppose this is all correct — that, though human vision is capable of
integrating  a  wide  range  of  two-dimensional  spatial  forms  from  lower
dimensional  spatial  information,  its  integration  of  faces  enjoys  certain
advantages relative to that of other (equally complex) spatial forms within
this dimensional regime. Should we expect this fact about vision to hold of
other modalities capable of representing spatial form? Not at all. There is no
ex ante guarantee that a second modality,  m,  that also integrates spatial
information in two dimensions, will also carry out its integrations of faces in
the special ways in which vision appears to do. But if not, then we should be
unsurprised to find failures of crossmodal transfer between vision and m for
representation of faces (or other properties to which the two modalities are
differentially attuned). 
We can test  this  conclusion by comparing face perception  in  vision
against face perception in two other modalities capable of representing two-
dimensional spatial form: ordinary haptic touch, and an artificial modality for
sensory  substitution  that  presents  the  outputs  of  visual  transducers  to
(normal)  audition:  the  Prosthesis  for  Substitution  of  Vision  with  Audition
(PSVA) of Capelle et al, 1998.
Consider  first  the  comparison  to  haptic  touch.  One  significant
difference between visual and haptic integrations of two-dimensional form is
that  the  two  modalities  differ  in  the  lower-dimensional  foundational
information from which the integrations are performed: vision works from
point-colours (or point-intensities) in an external space, while haptic touch
works from point-pressure in bodily space (often accompanied by awareness
of willed motion of our hands and other body parts). However, despite these
foundational-step differences in the lower-dimensional data available to the
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two modalities, it  turns out that vision and haptic touch converge on the
results of form integrations in a wide range of cases. Moreover, and perhaps
yet more surprisingly, there is evidence that haptic touch treats facehood, in
particular, as special in some of the ways that vision does. Specifically, the
existence of a Thatcher effect for haptic touch that parallels the Thatcher
effect for vision (Kilgour and Lederman 2006) provides strong evidence that
haptic touch, like vision, is specially attuned to facehood, relative to equally
complex  two-dimensional  spatial  forms  (Lederman,  Klatzky,  and  Kitada
2010). And, since the two modalities align in apportioning importance (i.e.,
computational  resources)  to  this  one  property  of  facehood,  it's  not  too
surprising to learn that there is, indeed, bidirectional cross-modal transfer for
facehood between them in priming studies (Reales and Ballesteros, 1999;
Easton et al.,1997a, b; Hadjikhani and Roland, 1998; Kilgour and Lederman,
2002; Casey and Newell, 2003, 2007; Norman et al., 2004).14
Now consider the perception of two-dimensional form through PSVA.
Here, again, the foundational data from which the modality integrates two-
dimensional  form  information—consisting  of  auditory  pitches  organized
temporally,  accompanied  by  awareness  of  willed  motion  of  the
head/mounted receptor array—is quite different from the data on the basis of
which vision performs its form integrations.  Should one expect that there
would  be  significant  differences  in  the  integrative  processing  methods
employed by PSVA and vision? Our point is that what we know about vision
and haptic touch gives us no firm basis for answering this question one way
or  the  other.  In  particular,  we cannot  assume that  the  form integrations
corresponding to faces will be favoured under PSVA (as they are in vision and
14  Investigators have taken these findings to suggest that vision and touch processes
share at least some structural  representations of faces. It  remains controversial  whether
such  shared  representations  are  more  closely  allied  with  a  format  used  by  one  of  the
modalities  (which  would  mean that  interaction  with  the  other  modality  would  involve  a
certain amount of representational remapping), or whether they are expressed in a common
and modally unspecific format.
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haptic touch) over those corresponding to equally complex forms. And there
is no evidence of a Thatcher effect for PSVA. 15
What can we conclude from the above evidence? First, it seems that
there are certain similarities between vision and touch with regard to the
construction of face-ideas. This suggests that there will be some cross-modal
carry-over between the two modalities. Of course, it would be far too hasty
to  jump to a  positive  response to the Molyneux-type question  whether a
newly sighted man could recognize the face of his lover by sight alone.16
And,  indeed,  it  would  be  too  quick  even  to  conclude  that  he  could
immediately make judgements like "That looks like a hooked nose." For as
we  noted  earlier,  similarity  of  content  does  not  imply  equal  ease  of
application.  Nevertheless,  we  can  expect  some  cross-modal  parallels
between visual and haptic face perception that do not hold with respect to
the visual and haptic perception of spatial form in general. It would not be
surprising,  for  example,  to  find  that  the  newly  blind  person  would
preferentially pick up on certain cues for face recognition or be quicker to
learn it under haptic presentation. So, while we would not have an answer to
Molyneux’s question for faces, we would expect some positive answers in the
general vicinity.17
However,  we  cannot  assume  that  any  such  correspondence  would
generalize  to  other  cases.  As  noted,  there  is  a  mismatch  between  the
capacities for integrating faces in vision (where such integrations are given
special status relative to other integrations built  from spatial foundational
data) and in PSVA (where they are not). Under these conditions, one would
15 There  are  other  sensory  substitution  systems  that  transform  visual  input  to
auditory output; consistent with our general approach, we also should not assume that any
conclusions about PSVA will extend to these.
16 Brian  Glenney  notes  that  face-blindess  is  a  common  deficit  among  the  newly
sighted (Fine et al,  2003;  Cattaneo and Vecchi 2011: 98-102). Whether this is related to
Molyneux’s Question is unclear.
17 This is broadly consonant with the differences in learning speed for different cues
reported by Sinha and colleagues for shapes. See Matthen and Cohen forthcoming: section
VI.
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not  expect  that  there  should  be  crossmodal  transfer  of  integration  for
facehood between the two modalities.18 
Having made these observations, it is now natural to ask whether and
how widely the special integrative processes at work in vision (and perhaps
other modalities) extend. On the evidence, there do appear to be other types
of two-dimensional spatial forms, beyond human faces, to which vision (at
least)  applies  special  integrative  processes.  Take,  for  instance,  the visual
system's ability to classify automatically, quickly, and easily, certain but not
other, equally complex, patterns of a few moving points of light as reflecting
the motion of key joints in a moving organism (Johansson 1973).
Figure 2: Subjects visually distinguish moving patterns that reflect the
motion of key joints in an organism from random, but equally complex,
patterns.
Like visual perception of faces, visual perception of biological motion
appears  to  involve  specialized processing (Lu 2010),  to  be carried  out  in
specialized areas (Allison et al  2000;  Grossman, et  al  2000),  and can be
spared in injuries that damage gross motor and other spatial abilities (Jordan
et.  al  2002;  Kim  et.  al  2008).  Moreover,  there  is  a  Thatcher  effect  for
18 Specifically, one would not expect to see crossmodal  transfer of integration for
facehood from the modality attuned to the property (vision) to the modality not attuned to
the property (PSVA); this leaves it open that there might be transfer in the other direction.
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biological motion as well: it is significantly easier to detect local anomalies
(anomalies that perturb the visual classification of the motion as biological)
in displays that are right side up than in displays that are inverted (Troje and
Westhoff 2006; Mirenzi and Hiris 2011). 
And, indeed, there is evidence that at least some of the criteria we
have appealed to in the foregoing extend to yet further properties (especially
with perceptual learning).  Thus, Twedt, Sheinberg, and Gauthier 2007, and
Wong et. al. 2010 find evidence of a Thatcher effect in vision for a range of
non-face object types, including cars, buildings, bikes, and letter strings. And
researchers have found face-like reduced reaction times in visual recognition
tasks and disproportionate costs for recognizing inverted figures by experts
with  a  wide  range  of  non-face  domains,  including  particular  dog  breeds
(Diamond and Carey, 1986), and novel artificial ("greeble") figures (Gauthier
& Tarr, 1997).19
Taken together, these results suggest that vision can become specially
attuned to—can come to perform specialized integrations  for—a range of
form properties in a variety of ways, some perhaps innately specified, some
perhaps not. However wide this range turns out to be, it  does seem that
vision is, in the ways we have elaborated, more attuned to some spatial form
properties than others. Thus, even if it is true (and it may not be) that the
ideas enlisted in the visual perception of form all share a common spatial
foundation, they may nonetheless differ in the way they are integrated from
their foundations. And if there can be such differences for ideas of spatial
form  within a  modality,  there  is  all  the  more  reason  for  thinking  that
crossmodal transfer may fail. For, again, modalities might build their ideas of
a spatial form from distinct foundations, and even if they share foundations,
they  may  carry  out  their  compositional  steps  in  different  ways,  so  that
19 The generalizability of such face-like effects to other properties naturally leads to
doubts about whether the allegedly face-specific processing and face-specific neural areas
are as domain-dedicated as many have held.
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whatever special advantages (of speed, accuracy, etc.) exhibited in a first
modality may fail to manifest in a second.
VII.  Another  Clue  to  Modality-Specific  Processing:  Evidence  from
Illusion
Another strategy for uncovering modality-specific forms of integration
that  may  impede  crossmodal  transfer  involves  reflecting  on  classic
perceptual illusions. Perceptual illusions within a modality can be viewed as
signatures  of  integrative  processes  at  work  within  that  modality  because
they reflect how these processes can go wrong in reconstructing the world.
That vision responds to the Müller -Lyer configuration in its usual, illusory,
way,  tells  us  that  the processes underlying our  visual  integration  of  two-
dimensional form lead to a characteristic type of misestimate—one that may
or  may  not  be  replicated  by  integrative  processes  for  the  same  two-
dimensional form in other modalities.20
Now,  investigators  have  known  for  some  time  that  the  Müller-Lyer
illusion,  and other  geometric  illusions  (e.g.,  the Poggendorff,  the vertical-
horizontal illusion) have counterparts in haptic perception (Bean 1938, Over
1966). Commentators have sometimes concluded that such transfer between
modalities  will  occur  quite  generally  (e.g.,  across  many different  pairs  of
natural  and  artefactual  modalities,  especially  after  extended  perceptual
learning).21 We want to suggest that the evidence supports a more guarded
20 Highlighting failures of  crossmodal  transfer for  this  class of  integrations  is  also
useful in bringing out that special features of particular modalities need not be those that
possess adaptive significance. This is salutary because it takes us beyond the domain of
biologically significant features such as facehood and biological motion.
21 For example, such optimism about transfer emerges from the reports of Gerard
Guarniero (1977), a congenitally blind philosophy Ph.D. student who served as a subject for
Paul Bach y Rita's celebrated work with Tactile-Visual Sensory Substitution (TVSS), and who
went on to write a dissertation on space perception (Guarniero 1977b), and also from the
approving citations of these remarks by Bach y Rita (1984) and Noë and O'Regan (2002).
Unfortunately,  it  is  somewhat  unclear  what  to  make  of  these  claims:  both  because
Guarniero's reports are anecdotal, and because it is not obvious that the emerging abilities
are perceptual rather than post-perceptual, it is not obvious that they show anything at all
about intermodal transfer. 
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assessment:  sometimes transfer occurs, sometimes it  does not, and even
where it does there may be interesting differences to note.
To begin with a case of successful transfer, consider the susceptibility
of haptic perception to the same errors of line length estimation present in
visual perception of the Müller-Lyer configuration. It is striking that the effect
not only occurs in both visual and haptic perception, but that its visual and
haptic manifestations are analogous in a number of more specific respects.
In both cases, errors are larger for more acute angles (Over 1966, Heller et.
al. 2002) and decrease with exposure time/perceptual learning (Rudel and
Teuber 1963). In both cases, explicit instructions to ignore the fins in favour
of focusing on body-centered cues reduces error rates significantly (Millar
and  Al-Attar  2002).  And  there  is  a  strong  positive  correlation  between
magnitudes  of  visual  and  haptic  misestimates  within  individual  subjects
(Gentaz  et.  al.  2004).  Finally,  the  haptic  effect  seems equally  present  in
sighted,  sighted  but  blindfolded,  sighted  but  low-vision,  and  congenitally
blind subjects (Heller et. al. 2002). This series of shared features is notable,
and encourages the impression that analogous integrative mechanisms may
be at work across modalities.
On  the  other  hand,  we  can  see  that  this  situation  is  far  from
guaranteed by considering a pair of papers by Laurent Renier and colleagues
on  two  classic  cases—the  Ponzo  illusion  (depicted  in  figure  3)  and  the
vertical-horizontal  illusion  (depicted  in  figure  4)—in  subjects  using  a
prosthesis for substitution of vision with audition (PSVA) (Renier et. al. 2005;
Renier, Bruyer, and DeVolder 2006).
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Figure 3 The Ponzo illusion: Parallel horizontal lines of equal length
appear unequal when displayed over a pair of oblique lines that converge
toward the top of the display.
Figure 4 The Vertical-Horizontal Illusion: Subjects systematically over-
estimate the length of vertical lines.
Renier et al were able to induce both the Ponzo and vertical-horizontal
illusions (in some subjects) under PSVA, but only after a non-trivial period of
training  with  the  new modality.  This  would  seem to  show,  by  itself,  that
facility  with  the  (characteristically  illusion-prone)  integration  of  two-
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dimensional  length information in vision does not transfer immediately to
just any other modality capable of recovering two-dimensional form.
But putting things this  way understates the obstacles to intermodal
transfer  uncovered  by  this  work.  In  fact,  Renier  et.  al.  2005 report  that,
initially, their subjects were not susceptible to the Ponzo illusion under PSVA
at all,  because they were able to perform the line length estimation task
without attending to representations of the converging oblique lines crucial
to the visual version of the illusion. Only by requiring subjects using PSVA to
consider the two oblique lines of the stimuli before comparing the length of
the two horizontal bars, could they make the illusion re-emerge. But even
under  this  condition,  the  effect  remained  weak:  they found  the  effect  in
sighted subjects (but still smaller in magnitude than among control sighted
subjects  not  using  PSVA),  but  not  at  all  in  their  “early  blind”  subjects
(subjects  blind  before  their  20th  month of  age).  And Renier,  Bruyer,  and
DeVolder (2006) report a similar pattern for the vertical-horizontal illusion:
the  effect  was  strongest  in  sighted  control  subjects  not  using  PSVA,
somewhat  weaker  in  blindfolded  sighted  subjects  using  PSVA,  and
completely absent in early blind subjects using PSVA.
These results illustrate different obstacles to crossmodal transfer for
integration,  even  for  a  pair  of  modalities  capable  of  recovering  two-
dimensional  form  properties.  First,  perceptual  expertise  for  the  relevant
integration type may be present in one modality but not the other, with the
result that transfer is impossible without (possibly quite elaborate) training.
Second, because perceptual attention may be fixed in quite different ways
between the two modalities, integrations that depend on which elements of a
perceptual configuration are attended (or in what order) may succeed in one
modality but not another. Third, and finally, the results with both the Ponzo
and  the  vertical-horizontal  configurations  show  that  the  possibility  or
robustness  of  a  given  integrative  strategy  may  depend  on  the  subject's
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perceptual  history with a given modality;  consequently,  between-modality
variation in this respect may block crossmodal transfer as well.
VIII. Perceptual Affect: Does It Carry Over?
Finally, it is worth noting yet another perceptual phenomenon that falls
under  ibn  Tufail's  rubric  of  learning  and  potentially  under  Molyneux's
paradigm of crossmodal transfer as well. This is the link between perception
and affect in what has been called evaluative perception. Introspection and a
large and growing body of evidence reveal that our perceptual states have
an  affective  dimension—certain  smells  are  disgusting,  certain  tactile
experiences  pleasant, certain flavours  repulsive, certain sights and sounds
beautiful, certain pains unbearable, certain melodies melancholy, and so on.
An  aperçu  of  Ibn  Tufail  invites  us  to  consider  the  transferability  of  such
affect: he says that his newly-sighted man experiences “great joy” when he
becomes  visually  acquainted  with  the  colours—his  earlier  descriptive
knowledge of them presumably offered no such delights. (Goodman 19xx, 7-
8)
Despite significant controversy about the best theoretical account of
the  affective  dimensions  of  perceptual  experience,  we  can  take  it  as  a
relatively  uncontroversial  starting  point  that  these  phenomena  can  be
characterized in terms of three central psychological features: at a minimum,
affective perceptual states are valenced; they have motivational force; and
they confer reasons to the subjects in whom they occur.22
Evaluative perception raises all kinds of interesting questions, but two
in  particular  are  relevant  to  our  present  investigation.  The first,  which  is
closer  to  ibn  Tufail's,  is  whether  affect  is  a  constituent  part  of  certain
perceptions  or  a  distinct  state  that  accompanies  them.  Is  the  perceptual
experience  of  certain  melodies  itself  sad  or  melancholy,  or  are  these
22 For useful overviews of philosophical work on this topic, see Aydede and Fulkerson
(2015) and Bergqvist and Cowan (2018).
28
WHAT WAS MOLYNEUX’S QUESTION A QUESTION ABOUT?
emotions  mere  accompaniments?  Would  an  inexperienced  listener
necessarily feel the emotions of the “morning effect” when he listened to a
sensitive rendering of Raga Vibhas?23 Is startle part and parcel of hearing
sudden  loud  sounds,  or  is  it  a  distinct  state  that  has  somehow become
associated  with  them?  Would  someone  necessarily  jump  when  she  first
heard a clap of thunder or a flash of lightning? Must a newly sighted person
become erotically aroused at her first sight of a naked body?
The  second,  closely  related to  Molyneux's,  is  this:  Is  a  person who
experiences something in one modality subject to the same affect as when
she experiences it in another? Would a newly sighted person experience a
shape  or  a  texture  as  visually  pleasant  if  she  had  previously  found  it
haptically pleasant (holding relevant contextual dimensions fixed)? Could she
experience  it  as  visually  pleasant  though  haptically  without  affect,  or  as
visually pleasant and haptically unpleasant?
We see no a priori reason to believe that distinct modalities need (or
for that matter need not) bear or connect with the same/analogous affective
dimensions at all. Nor is it obvious, in the case that they do, that a history of
experiences of a given affective type in one modality will (or won't) facilitate
the acquisition or deployment of that affective type in a different modality.
How soon before a newly sighted person has visual affective startle/erotic
arousal/musical  pleasure? Would having a history of  repulsion in olfaction
give the newly sighted person an advantage in acquiring affective repulsion
in vision (relative to a newly sighted person without a history of olfactory
repulsion)?
As in other cases considered above, there might not be a single answer
across the board. We take it that the answers to these Molyneux Questions
about affect are unobvious, and will depend on the local, particular, details of
the psychological mechanisms implicated by the specific modalities at issue.
23 Raga Vibhas, which is usually played before sunrise, is said to evoke a feeling of
the morning in listeners. The reader can judge for herself at https://youtu.be/YAt6jW8QvJE
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IX. Conclusion
As  we  have  seen,  Molyneux's  question,  ostensibly  about  the
crossmodal application of sensory knowledge,  is  a special instance of the
broader set of questions (prompted by ibn Tufail) about the fungibility of the
senses—that  is,  about  how  knowledge  and  general  representations/ideas
that  are  normally  formed  in  one  way  in  one  modality  can  be  formed  in
another  way in  another  modality.  This  broader  question  about  fungibility
leads  us  to  ask  about  the  respects  in  which  such  ideas  do  and  do  not
converge, as well as the range of crossmodal transfers they underwrite. The
variety evident in the cases we've examined shows that no general answers
are  forthcoming:  there  are  instances  of  both  crossmodal  divergence  and
convergence;  and  even  convergence,  where  it  is  found,  is  insufficient  to
guarantee  crossmodal  transfer.  Given  all  this  variety,  it  is  likely  that  an
adequate response to Molyneux's question will require coming to grips with
the broader set of issues raised by ibn Tufail.24
24 We are grateful for comments from and discussion with Matthew Fulkerson, Ayoob
Shahmoradi,  and Brian Tracz,  and for suggestions from the editors of this volume, all  of
which have much improved the paper.
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